\u3ci\u3eUnited States v. Verdugo-Urquidez:\u3c/i\u3e Hands Across the Border - The Long Reach of United States Agents Abroad, and the Short Reach of the Fourth Amendment by Oppenheim, Mindy Ann
Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 17
Issue 3
Symposium:
Transnational Insolvency: A Multinational View of
Bankruptcy
Article 9
12-1-1991
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez: Hands Across the
Border - The Long Reach of United States Agents
Abroad, and the Short Reach of the Fourth
Amendment
Mindy Ann Oppenheim
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Mindy A. Oppenheim, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez: Hands Across the Border - The Long Reach of United States Agents Abroad, and
the Short Reach of the Fourth Amendment, 17 Brook. J. Int'l L. 617 (1991).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol17/iss3/9
COMMENTS
UNITED STATES v. VERDUGO-
URQUIDEZ: HANDS ACROSS THE
BORDER - THE LONG REACH OF
UNITED STATES AGENTS ABROAD,
AND THE SHORT REACH OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution1
acts as a limitation upon governmental searches and seizures.
The amendment has traditionally put United States courts in a
position to protect the public from potentially overzealous law
enforcement personnel.2 Decisions in the past thirty years sug-
gest that the Fourth Amendment protects privacy.3 Until re-
1. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. Saltzburg, The Reach of the Bill of Rights Beyond the Terra Firma of the
United States, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 741, 744 (1980) [hereinafter Saltzburg].
3. A right of privacy was, in fact, created by the Fourth Amendment. L. LEvy, OmG-
iNAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERs' CONSTITUTION 222, 246 (1988). Judicial interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment has acknowledged a person's expectation of privacy. One way
this has been done is by including this expectation in the balancing process through
which the Court decides Fourth Amendment cases. See, e.g., United States v. Biswell,
406 U.S. 311 (1972) (warrantless inspection of a gun shop, authorized under the Gun
Control Act of 1968, is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment because the owner of
such a shop is alerted to inspection ordinances as part of the licensing procedures and
thus expects them); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (permanent
immigration checkpoints are not a violation of the Fourth Amendment because of immi-
gration law enforcement considerations and adequate road signs warning travelers); Na-
tional Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (mandatory drug
testing for employees seeking jobs in drug interdiction and positions requiring them to
carry a firearm is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment because governmental inter-
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cently, however, the courts have not delineated exactly whose
privacy is protected.
In February 1990, the Supreme Court of the United States,
in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,4 addressed the issue of
whether Fourth Amendment protection extends to a nonresident
alien whose property, located on foreign soil, is searched by
United States law enforcement personnel. Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's majority opinion held that a foreign national is not enti-
tled to Fourth Amendment protection.5 This decision appears to
be the first time since the famous "Insular Cases" that a United
States court has specifically recognized a class of people who fall
under United States municipal law but do not benefit from
United States constitutional safeguards. The majority compris-
ing the Verdugo-Urquidez opinion agree only that this search
and seizure was constitutional; the weakness of the Court's opin-
ion lies in the mere plurality of Justices who agree on the spe-
cific reasons why.7
This Comment analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in
Verdugo-Urquidez. It examines the reasoning and differences
between the majority opinion and the two concurrences, as well
as the dissenting opinions. This analysis is undertaken in light
of the history of the Bill of Rights and the language of the
Fourth Amendment, the application of the Fourth Amendment
to citizens of foreign states, and the United States policies that
underlie the erosion of the scope of the Fourth Amendment both
here and abroad.
This Comment finds that the Supreme Court's decision in
Verdugo-Urquidez withholds Fourth Amendment protection
from the vast class of people who do not live on United States
ests override an individual's expectation of privacy).
4. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
5. Id. at 261-62.
6. The "Insular Cases" were a series of decisions in the early part of this century in
which the Supreme Court held that citizens of United States territories are not entitled
to the same constitutional safeguards as people residing in the United States. L. HENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972). See, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S.
244 (1901); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138
(1904); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914); Balzac v. Porto Rico [sic], 258 U.S.
298 (1922); see infra note 36.
7. The decision was six to three, with Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun
dissenting. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices
Kennedy and Stevens who filed separate concurring opinions. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494
U.S. 259.
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soil, do not have "substantial connections" with the United
States, and, yet, are expected to observe United States laws.
Further, the splintered Verdugo-Urquidez opinion does not elu-
cidate clear reasoning that lower courts can apply.9 Finally, this
Comment concludes that the Supreme Court majority is using
the Constitution to further current United States anti-drug en-
forcement policy on an international level.
II. UNITED STATES V. VERDUGO-URQUIDEZ
A. Facts and Procedure
Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez is a Mexican citizen and
resident. In response to an outstanding United States warrant
for his arrest, several Mexican police officers apprehended
Verdugo-Urquidez on January 24, 1986, in Mexico. 10 The Mexi-
can officers handcuffed Verdugo-Urquidez, forced him to lie face
down, and covered him with a jacket in the back of the police
car for the two hour drive to the Mexican-United States bor-
der.1" Verdugo-Urquidez, who was not told why he was appre-
hended, was subsequently handed over to several United States
Marshals at the border. 2 Terry Bowen, a Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) agent who was expecting Verdugo-Urquidez's ar-
rival at the border, transported Verdugo-Urquidez to a correc-
tional facility in San Diego.' 3 Though contrary to the Mexican
Constitution 4 and a United States-Mexico extradition treaty,15
8. The Supreme Court, 1989 Term: Leading Cases: L Constitutional Law; F.
Search and Seizure, 104 HARv. L. REv. 276, 280 (1990) [hereinafter The Supreme Court,
1989 Term].
9. The application of the holding in Verdugo-Urquidez to other cases, with different
fact patterns, is unclear. The Supreme Court, 1989 Term, supra note 8, at 280.
10. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1216 (9th Cir. 1988).
11. Id.
12. Verdugo-Urquidez was actually stuffed through a hole in the fence marking the
United States-Mexican border. It is not uncommon for the United States to obtain juris-
diction over foreign nationals in ways other than those provided for in treaties. This type
of irregular extradition is often carried out with the foreign government's consent. The
United States paid six Mexican officers to kidnap and deliver Verdugo-Urquidez to the
United States Marshal's Service at the border. Mexico protested two and a half years
after the kidnapping. No action was taken by the United States to satisfy the tardy
complaint. Murphy, Special Project: Drug Diplomacy and the Supply-Side Strategy: A
Survey of United States Practice, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1259, 1294, 1300 (1990) [hereinafter
Murphy]. See infra note 23; see also Ker v. People of the State of Illinois, 119 U.S. 436
(1886); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
13. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1216.
14. Much like our own Fourth Amendment, Article 16 of the Mexican Constitution
necessitates a written order, containing specifics, from the appropriate judicial authority
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this illegal extradition was accomplished without significant offi-
cial Mexican protest. 16
Agent Bowen believed that a search of Verdugo-Urquidez's
Mexicali and San Felippe homes (both in Baja California, Mex-
ico) would yield evidence of a drug operation and homicide. 17
Assistant Special Agent White (in charge of DEA operations in
Mexico) gave Agent Bowen permission to search Verdugo-Ur-
quidez's Mexican property and agreed to contact the Mexican
authorities, even though Agent Bowen had never consulted the
Justice Department. 8 At Special Agent White's request, Direc-
tor General Ventura of the Mexican Federal Judicial Police
(MFJP) agreed to the search. Four DEA agents (all of whom
knew that Verdugo-Urquidez had been arrested), along with ten
to fifteen MFJP officers supplied by Director Ventura, partici-
pated in the search. A MFJP commandante told the DEA agents
that they would be able to take the fruits of the search back to
the United States.'"
The searches of both homes took place on the night of Jan-
uary 25, 1986. The DEA agents who took an active role in the
searches did not inventory or receipt Verdugo-Urquidez's be-
prior to molesting a person or their possessions. Wedgewood, Extraterritorial Jurisdic-
tion - Applicability of Constitutional Restraints to U.S. Officials Acting Abroad -
Searches by U.S. Officials of Alien-Owned Premises in Foreign Countries, 84 Am. J.
INT'L L. 747, 748-49 (1990) [hereinafter Wedgewood] (citing Flanz & Moreno, Constitu-
tion of Mexico, in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (1988)).
15. Federal District Judge Edward Rafeedie ruled that the extradition treaty be-
tween the United States and Mexico was violated when a Dr. Humberto Alverez (sus-
pected of involvement with the Camarena murder) was forcibly abducted from Guadala-
jara, Mexico and brought to the United States for trial. The Mexican authorities said
that there was an opportunity to dissolve tension between the United States and Mexico.
The Mexican officials' views were vindicated when Judge Rafeedie sent Alverez back to
Mexico. The Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 17, 1990, at 6.
16. The question remains as to why no one in Mexico complained when Rene
Verdugo-Urquidez was forcibly abducted and brought to the United States. A Mexican
official attributes the lack of protest to the different regimes in power in Mexico and the
United States at the time. Id. The recent turnaround is accredited to Mexican domestic
public policy. Id. See also supra note 15.
17. At the time, Verdugo-Urquidez was also suspected of participating in the brutal
kidnapping and torture-murder of DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena Salazar.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1215. Verdugo-Urquidez has been convicted of the
Camarena Salazar murder and is currently serving a life plus 240 years sentence. L.A.
Times, Dec. 13, 1989, at A3, col. 5. He is not eligible for parole until age 96. L.A. Times,
Apr. 17, 1989, at A2, col. 5. Other persons have either been convicted of this murder or
are currently awaiting trial for that crime. See, e.g., Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896
F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1990).
18. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1216 n.2.
19. Id. at 1225, 1226.
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longings.20 The DEA took possession of all pertinent documenta-
tion while the MFJP confiscated all firearms that were discov-
ered. At about three or four o'clock in the morning MFJP
officers grew weary, and the commandante told Agent Bowen to
take all of the documents in a particular briefcase and to sort
through them later. Of all the documents seized from either of
Verdugo-Urquidez's residences, only one tally sheet2 ' (that was
contained in the briefcase) was introduced at trial.22
After a hearing, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of California suppressed the tally-sheet stating
that "the fourth amendment to the Constitution applied to the
DEA's search because it was a 'joint venture' of United States
and Mexican police officers. '23 The district court also concluded
that a search of a foreign national, conducted by United States
agents on foreign soil and yielding evidence to be used at a trial
in the United States, entitles that individual to Fourth Amend-
ment protection. 24 The district court specifically stated that the
search was invalid because
the DEA failed to seek a warrant ... [and] even if a warrant
was not required ... the DEA's conduct in carrying out that
search was not reasonable because the search was unconstitu-
tionally general, it occurred after midnight and the DEA failed
to leave a contemporaneous inventory of the evidence seized.25
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's findings.26 The Supreme Court granted certiorari for the
evidentiary issue27 and reversed the lower courts, allowing the
20. Id. at 1227.
21. The government believed that this "tally sheet" revealed the "quantities of ma-
rijuana smuggled by [the defendant] into the United States." United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 262-63 (1990).
22. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1226, 1227.
23. Id. at 1217. The level of involvement of United States personnel in law enforce-
ment on foreign soil dictates the necessity of following United States law. For a more
complete explanation of the "joint venture doctrine," see United States v. Emery, 591
F.2d 1266, 1268 (9th Cir. 1978).
24. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1217.
25. Id.
26. In a two-to-one decision, Circuit Judge Wallace filed a lengthy dissent. Id. at
1214.
27. The only issue on appeal concerned the admissibility of the tally sheet that was
found in the briefcase removed from one of Verdugo-Urquidez's homes. The forcible ab-
duction of Verdugo-Urquidez was not at issue. According to the "Ker-Frisbie Rule," "the
power of a court to try a person for a crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been
brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of 'forcible abduction.'" Ker v. People
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tally sheet into evidence.28
B. The Supreme Court's Rationale
The Supreme Court, in five published opinions, 2" uses anal-
yses which encompass three general approaches: an analysis of
the language of the Fourth Amendment, an application of this
language to Verdugo-Urquidez, and an analysis of current na-
tional drug policies that underlie the holding of this case.30 Al-
though they comprise one third of the Court majority, both Jus-
tice Kennedy and Justice Stevens disagree with Chief Justice
Rehnquist (the author of the plurality opinion) on critical por-
tions of his analysis.3 1 Justices Kennedy and Stevens' concur-
rences do not stand alone in supporting the Court's holding. Be-
cause of the different justifications given for the holding among
the majority of the Court in this case, the application of this new
precedent could either be very fact-specific or could greatly ex-
pand the holding beyond its current parameters.3 1
1. The Majority Composite
The majority of the Supreme Court holds that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply "to the search and seizure by United
of the State of Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 440 (1886); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522
(1952). More recently this doctrine has come under attack as a due process violation.
Courts now rid themselves of cases in which jurisdiction is attained through constitu-
tional violations. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 272-75 (2d Cir. 1974). Tos-
canino does not control in this case 'because jurisdiction over the defendant is not at
issue.
28. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
29. The five published opinions comprise the majority opinion (reflecting a four Jus-
tice plurality), two concurrences, and two dissenting opinions. Id.
30. Id.
31. See infra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
32. So far, lower federal courts have subscribed to the Verdugo-Urquidez rationale,
especially in drug seizure cases. See United States v. Van Sichem, SS No. 89 Cr. 813,
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12597 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (court is bound by Verdugo-Urquidez in
denying a remedy to a Dutch national whose Amsterdam apartment was searched in
connection with the joint Dutch-United States investigation of a heroin ring). The lan-
guage of the opinion has been interpreted to also apply to vessels owned by nonresident
aliens which are searched in international waters. See United States v. Aikens, 912 F.2d
285 (9th Cir. 1990) (drugs seized from nonresident aliens while in international waters
does not trigger the Fourth Amendment, as per Verdugo-Urquidez); United States v.
Davis, 905 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1990) (a retroactive application of Verdugo-Urquidez to an
appeal of a search and seizure of a vessel in international waters, which is owned by a
nonresident alien, is based on the language of Verdugo-Urquidez since Verdugo-Ur-
quidez specifics no exception for activities on the high seas).
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States agents of property that is owned by a nonresident alien
and located in a foreign country. ' 33 The Chief Justice, writing
for a four-Justice plurality, begins with the language of the
Fourth Amendment. He finds that the term "the people" as it is
used in the Fourth Amendment is a term of art,3 4 referring to
only those present in the country and having sufficient connec-
tion to the country.3 5
Turning to the application of the Fourth Amendment to
Verdugo-Urquidez, Chief Justice Rehnquist relies heavily on the
"Insular Cases" to show that the Bill of Rights does not auto-
matically extend to foreign nationals under United States con-
trol.8 6 This line of cases, which is still good law in United States
unincorporated territories," holds that an United States exercise
of power does not necessarily invoke the Constitution.3 8 Chief
Justice Rehnquist relies in' part on Johnson v. Eisentrager"9 to
show that even the Fifth Amendment's due process guarantee is
not naturally extended to nonresident aliens.4"
The Chief Justice strongly asserts the need for effective
United States foreign policy as a reason for his holding.41 He is
concerned that the extension of Fourth Amendment rights to
nonresident aliens will somehow weaken the international politi-
cal clout of the United States:
[S]ituations threatening to important American interests may
arise half-way around the globe, situations which in the view of
the political branches of government require an American re-
sponse with armed force. If there are to be restrictions on
searches and seizures which occur incident to such American
33. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990).
34. Id. at 265.
35. Chief Justice Rehnquist defines a person with "sufficient connection" as a per-
son who would be considered a member of the national community. Id.
36. See, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S.
197 (1903); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Ocampo v. United States, 234
U.S. 91 (1914); Balzac v. Porto Rico [sic], 258 U.S. 298 (1922); see also supra note 6.
37. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONsTrrUTION 268 (1972). See also supra
notes 6 & 36.
38. See supra notes 6 and 36.
39. 339 U.S. 763 (1950). The Chief Justice relies upon Eisentrager (a habeas corpus
motion brought by defendants who were being held by the United States Army in Ger-
many after having been convicted by a military tribunal) to show that foreign nationals
are not guaranteed due process of the law. In Elsentrager, however, the defendant was
an enemy soldier - a German soldier who, during World War H operated against the
,United States in China.
40. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990).
41. Id. at 273-74.
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action, they must be imposed by the political branches through
diplomatic understanding, treaty, or legislation.
42
However, the Chief Justice neglects to assert that even Verdugo-
Urquidez is considered to be innocent until proven guilty.43
Justice Kennedy, unlike the Chief Justice, does not place
great weight on the term "the people" in his concurrence. He
claims that "the force of the Constitution is not confined be-
cause it was brought into being by certain persons who gave
their immediate assent to its terms."' 44 Instead, Justice Kennedy
defers to the "unascertainable conceptions of reasonableness and
privacy that [will] prevail abroad, and the need to cooperate
with foreign officials . . . .,4 Unlike the Chief Justice, Justice
Kennedy believes that the Fifth Amendment guarantee of due
process will safeguard the foreign national who is prosecuted by
the United States. 46
In a separate concurrence, Justice Stevens dismisses the
analysis of the meaning of "the people" altogether. Justice Ste-
vens asserts that even if "the people" is read as protecting only
those persons lawfully in the United States, Verdugo-Urquidez
is among "the people. '47 Even though Verdugo-Urquidez was
brought to the United States against his will, he is lawfully in
the country, and the search of his home took place after he was
imprisoned.48 Justice Stevens takes a somewhat impotent view
of United States abilities in foreign lands by relying on the be-
lief that a search warrant would have been impracticable. 49 He
points out that a search warrant would have been useless since
the authorizing magistrate lacks jurisdiction in Mexico. 0 But,
like Justice Kennedy, Justice Stevens does not rely on the need
for national security in denying Verdugo-Urquidez Fourth
42. Id. at 275.
43. Chief Justice Rehnquist says that United States agents operating abroad should
not be limited in their activities aimed at apprehending those guilty of smuggling drugs.
He implies that Verdugo-Urquidez is guilty, by saying that "the result of accepting his
claimwould have significant and deleterious consequences for the United States in con-
ducting activities beyond its boundaries." Id. at 273.
44. Id. at 276.
45. Id. at 278.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 279.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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Amendment rights. 1
2. The Dissenting Array
The primary dissent, delivered by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, states that the majority opinion does not afford
United States legal protection for foreigners who are obliged to
follow United States law.2 In his examination of the text of the
amendment, Justice Brennan asserts that a doctrine of basic
fairness and mutuality underlies the Bill of Rights, thus protect-
ing all people.5 3 The dissent views the Bill of Rights as enumer-
ating pre-existing liberties rather than creating rights. 4
Not surprisingly, Justice Brennan disagrees with the Chief
Justice's interpretation of cases that have applied the Fourth
Amendment to foreign nationals in the past. Justice Brennan
points out that the "Insular Cases"55 apply only to United
States territories, and not to other sovereign states. The dissent
also effectively distinguishes Johnson v. Eisentrager" from the
instant case.
There is little agreement between Justice Brennan and the
Chief Justice in terms of policy considerations. Justice Bren-
nan's policy arguments posture the United States as an exam-
ple-setter in human and civil rights.5 Furthermore, Justice
Brennan characterizes Chief Justice Rehnquist's concerns about
national security 8 as a "doomsday scenario. ' '15
Justice Blackmun's short dissent voices his agreement with
much of Justice Brennan's dissent and Justice Stevens' concur-'
rence. Justice Blackmun adds that the Court has not examined
whether the agents had probable cause and whether the reasona-
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 284.
54. Id. at 288. For clarification of the view that the Bill of Rights creates rights, see
supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
55. See supra notes 6 and 36.
56. 339 U.S. 763 (1950). See supra note 39.
57. See supra notes 48 and 49. This decision indeed weakens the perception of
United States integrity in foreign eyes. The Chinese have criticized the Supreme Court
in that the Verdugo-Urquidez opinion teaches the world that the United States Consti-
tution does not truly safeguard international human rights because it allows law enforce-
ment officials to do whatever they like to achieve the United States view of justice. N.Y.
Times, Mar. 23, 1990, at B5, col. 5.
58. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
59. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 291 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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bleness requirement of the Fourth Amendment had been met.60
He questions the Court's ability to make a "reliable determina-
tion" on the case until a record, addressing probable cause and
the reasonableness of the search, has been built."'
C. Analysis of the Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court majority overlooks the necessity for
easily applicable law62 in favor of allowing the fruits of a search,
that in itself would be unconstitutional if it had occurred on
United States soil, to be used as evidence in a United States
court.6" The majority is actually comprised of a plurality plus
two Justices who concur in the holding, but whose rationale is
sometimes at odds with the reasoning of the majority opinion.
Through an analysis of the language of the Fourth Amendment,
an examination of how this amendment has been applied, and a
discussion of applicable policy considerations, the Court appears
to accomplish its agenda at the expense of the Bill of Rights.
1. The Text of the Fourth Amendment and Constitutional
Theory
The two major theories of Constitutional construction are
the "compact theory" and the "natural rights theory. '6 4 The
Chief Justice adopts the "compact theory," which is the belief
that the Constitution is a social contract between the govern-
ment and the governed. 5 The "compact theory" can be con-
trasted with the "natural rights theory," which advocates that
the rights enumerated in the Constitution are but inherent
rights set to paper.66 This view perceives the content of the Bill
of Rights not as governmental limitations, but as fundamental
60. Id. at 297-98.
61. Id.
62. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
64. For an excellent discussion of the two theories as well as references to the in-
stant case, see the majority and dissenting views in the circuit court opinion of United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1220-21 (9th Cir. 1988).
65. Id. at 1220-21.
66. The debate and tension between these two theories is present in a multitude of
cases and articles which seek to interpret and apply the Constitution. The circuit court
opinion, including the dissent, of the instant case offers a good summary of this issue.
-See id. at 1220 (citing 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES, §§ 327 at 296-97, 328 at 297-98, 340 at 309 (1883)); see also Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1 (1957).
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individual rights that are derived from a higher source. 7
There are many learned jurists and publicists who advocate
the natural rights theory. Justice Brennan, in his dissent, states,
"[the framers] designed the Bill of Rights to prohibit our gov-
ernment from infringing rights and liberties presumed to be pre-
existing. '68 Professor Louis Henkin has said that "individual's
rights do not derive from the Constitution. They are not consti-
tutional rights. . .[B]ut they are protected by the Constitution.
[T]he idea of rights. . . reflected in the Constitution applies to
all human beings. '"69 In support of this theory, Professor Henkin
points out that when the Constitution was penned, "all men"
and "the people" did not technically include many United
States citizens. 0 In contrast to the position taken by the Chief
Justice, Professor Henkin believes that the use of these terms
did not pertain to the idea of rights but were flaws in the think-
ing of the time.1
The Constitution, in order to be effective through time,
must be a combination of the .two theories. The framers may
have set down what they saw as natural rights in the Bill of
Rights, but the document as a whole can be perceived as a con-
tract between the government and the people who live under it.
This raises the question that is so often referred to in constitu-
tional analysis - what was the framers' intent? In The Federal-
ist, Number 84, Alexander Hamilton, a framer of the Bill of
Rights, assures New York that a Bill of Rights is inherent in the
Constitution and therefore unnecessary.72 Hamilton asks "...
why declare that things shall not be done which there is no'
power to do?"73 The Fourth Amendment, specifically, was
penned in reaction to overly-broad searches of the Colonists ac-
complished under general warrants, 4 but notions of privacy in
67. L. Henkin, Rights: Here and There, 81 COLUM. L. Rlv. 1581, 1587 (1981).
68. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 288 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
69. L. HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNrFE
STATES CONsTrruTo ABROAD 3 (1990) [hereinafter L. HENKIN].
70. For example, slaves, native Americans, and even white women did not warrant
the same constitutional protection afforded white men at that time. Id. at 3-4.
71. Id.
72. A. HAMILTON, J. MADISON, & J. JAY, THE FEDERALIST (1961) [hereinafter A. HAM-
ILTON, J. MADISON, & J. JAY].
73. Id. at 533.
74. E. CoRwiN, THE CoNsTrrrION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 341-42 (14th ed.
1978). See also Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 393 (1974) [hereinafter Amsterdam].
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one's home can be traced back to the Magna Carta.75 Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist claims that the Fourth Amendment is a purely
domestic doctrine because the framers did not believe that the
federal government had the power to conduct searches and
76seizures. Contrary to the Chief Justice's point of view, it can be
argued that although the framers were writing a domestic docu-
ment they did expect the Constitution to be fluid enough to
adapt to the growth of the nation."
Regardless of the espoused theory, Verdugo-Urquidez was
lawfully in the United States when his Mexican property was
searched by United States agents.7 8 A majority of the Supreme
Court, consisting of Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Ste-
vens, and Kennedy, are of the opinion that either "the people"
does not mean "the governed" or that Verdugo-Urquidez was
"governed" at the time of the search.7 9 Therefore, the conclusion
that the language of the Fourth Amendment applies to "the gov-
erned," and that Verdugo-Urquidez is thereby excluded from its
protection, is shared by only four Justices and is not the driving
force behind the holding in this case.
2. Analysis of the Fourth Amendment As It Has Been
Applied
The application of the Fourth Amendment to Verdugo-Ur-
quidez can be evaluated on two different levels: the international
scope of the Bill of Rights, and the specific application of the
Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Amendment itself does not constrain United States agents con-
ducting an extraterritorial search, but the Justices who comprise
the majority do not cite the same reasons.80 It is therefore im-
portant to look at both how the Bill of Rights has been histori-
cally applied to aliens, and the manner in which the Fourth
Amendment is applied domestically, in order to understand the
consequences of the Court's decision.
The actual texts of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights
75. L. LEvy, ORIGINA INTENT AND THE FRAmERS' CONSTITUTION 222 (1988).
76. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266-67 (1990).
77. Amsterdam, supra note 74, at 394.
78. Verdugo-Urquidez was brought to San Diego on January 24, 1986. His houses
were searched on January 25-26, 1986. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d
1214, 1216-17 (9th Cir. 1988).
79. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 259.
80. Id. See also supra notes 31-47 and accompanying text.
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do not place any limits or conditions on the enjoyment of
rights."' In fact, the courts have specifically extended many Bill
of Rights protections to aliens. For example, First Amendment
protection has been guaranteed to foreign nationals.8 2 An alien is
entitled to the protection of Fifth Amendment due process and
compensation for property confiscated by the United States
Government.8 The rights of the accused embodied in the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments are extended to all accused and tried
within the United States, regardless of their national status.8 4
Furthermore, outside of the Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantee of equal protection at the hands of the
individual states has also been applied to both legal resident
aliens 5 and illegal aliens.8 6
Chief Justice Rehnquist uses the "Insular Cases" to support
his statement that the Bill of Rights does not automatically ex-
tend to foreign nationals.8 ' However, in Reid v. Covert,8 Justice
Black distinguishes the "Insular Cases" by pointing out that
these decisions involved questions of Congressional power over
territories which were being assimilated into the United States."
Thus, as Justice Brennan points out in his dissent, the "Insular
Cases" are limited to their facts.9 There can be no doubt that
81. L. HENKIN, supra note 69, at 3-4.
82. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) (a communist alien was assured of the
First Amendment freedom of speech).
83. See Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931) (Russian cor-
poration who was an assignee of United States shipbuilding contracts was called an
"alien friend" and thus was entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amendment); Landon
v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982) (citizen of El Salvador who was a permanent resident
alien in the United States was denied re-entry into the United States and was made to
undergo an exclusionary hearing but was allowed to avail herself of Fifth Amendment
due process rights).
84. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (Chinese victims of the
Chinese Exclusionary Act of May 5, 1892 were guaranteed Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights); United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904) (guaranteeing the
Fifth and Sixth Amendment safeguards to aliens once they are in the United States).
85. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (a famous case involving discrimi-
nation against Chinese laundry owners in San Francisco; these Chinese aliens were af-
forded constitutional rights via the Fourteenth Amendment).
86. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 220 (1982) (the right of illegal alien children to at-
tend public school, thereby enjoying equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
87. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268-69 (1990). See supra
notes 6 and 36.
88. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
89. Id.
90. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 279 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the instant case does not involve a territory being annexed to
the United States.
It can be argued that the Fourth Amendment, like the Fifth
Amendment, "should not lose force because [it is] applied
outside U.S. territory.""' In Immigration and Naturalization
Service v. Lopez-Mendoza, 2 the Supreme Court found the
Fourth Amendment inapplicable to civil deportation procedures
because of the burden that the exclusionary rule would place on
administrative procedures."' However, there is language in that
opinion indicating that the Fourth Amendment might have an
impact on a more critical proceeding (such as a criminal trial).94
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority of the Court, refused
to condone any Fourth Amendment violations that may have
transpired.9 5 Indeed, the majority included the Fourth Amend-
ment among liberties that, if violated, "might transgress notions
of fundamental fairness." '
Not all searches on foreign soil, even those including a
United States citizen, have been traditionally subject to this
kind of scrutiny. United States courts have long held that
searches occurring on foreign soil conducted by foreign law en-
forcement personnel are not subject to constitutional re-
straints.9 Under the "silver platter" doctrine, the fruits of these
searches can be used by United States courts, regardless of the
conditions of the search."
There are two exceptions to the constitutionality of foreign
searches on foreign soil. First, if the search perpetrated upon the
91. Saltzburg, supra note 2, at 760.
92. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1040-43.
95. Id. at 1050.
96. Id. at 1050-51.
97. See Brennan v. University of Kansas, 451 F.2d 1287 (10th Cir. 1971) (where
constitutional constraints did not apply to an Italian search warrant executed in Italy on
a United States citizen); Stowe v. Devoy, 588 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1978) (where electronic
surveillance of a New York resident by Canadian authorities was deemed to be on for-
eign soil); Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1976) (where
electronic surveillance of United States citizens in Germany by German authorities was
not governed by the United States Constitution).
98. The "silver platter" doctrine governs the admissibility of evidence collected by
foreign officials on foreign soil where such evidence may have been obtained by a means
unavailable to United States police on United States soil. The theory is that the evidence
is not tainted because it was presented to the United States law enforcement personnel
on a "silver platter." See, e.g., Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 747-49 (9th Cir.
1968) (Browning, J., dissenting).
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citizen is so extreme as to "shock the conscience," the fruits of
the search can be excluded s9 Second, if the search was a result
of a joint venture between United States and foreign law en-
forcement personnel, the-subject of the search is entitled to con-
stitutional protection.100 The theory behind the second excep-
tion is that if a United States agent is actively participating with
foreign officials, that agent's conduct should be bound to the
same code that she would have to follow in a domestic opera-
tion.101 Under this theory the extent of United States involve-
ment in a foreign operation is critical and can only be ascer-
tained by examining the facts of each case. 02 For example, a
mere tip supplied by a United States agent to a foreign agent
does not constitute a joint venture. 03 On the other hand, direct
participation in a search, for example, touching the potential ev-
idence, will rise to the level of a joint venture.104
99. "The forum state will give effect to foreign law as long as the foreign law is not
repugnant to the moral sense of the community." Brennan v. University of Kansas, 451
F.2d at 1289. Abduction, interrogation, and physical torture (including narcotics, nour-
ishment and sleep deprivation, beatings, forced physical exertion, and siphoning alcohol
into bodily orifices) comprise circumstances which "shock the conscience" of United
States courts, thereby invoking the exclusionary rule. United States v. Toscanino, 500
F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
100. The Fourth Amendment does not apply to raids by foreign officials unless
United States officials "so substantially participate . . . as to convert that raid into a
joint venture" between the countries. Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 745 (9th
Cir. 1968) (documents which were provided to United States agents after being seized in
the Philippines by Philippine law enforcement personnel were admissible because, even
though United States officials shared intelligence that led to the raids with the Philip-
pines officials, the United States agents neither requested the raids nor participated in
them and, thus, the raids were not a joint venture); see also United States v. Peterson,
812 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1987) (evidence gathered through a warrantless wiretap and radio
monitoring scheme was suppressed because DEA agents called their actions a "joint in-
vestigation" with Philippine officials); United States v. Rose, 570 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir.
1978) (no joint venture existed, and the evidence was admissible, when a Canadian cus-
toms official discovered dutiable items in a false bottom of a suitcase and then turned
the defendant and the evidence over to a United States agent); United States v. Birdsell,
346 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1975) (evidence seized by Mexican officials, without the aid of
United States agents, was admissible because the.Fourth Amendment does not apply to
foreign officials in their own country).
101. Saltzburg, supra note 2, at 763. "If it is shown that American agents are in
privity with the search through direct participation" the evidence obtained will be inad-
missible in a United States court. United States v. Phillips, 479 F. Supp. 423, 431 (M.D.
Fla. 1979) (United States agents' involvement with Canadian law enforcement was not a
joint venture).
102. Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738, 745 (9th Cir. 1968).
103. Id. (citing Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1967)); see also
United States v. Derewal, 703 F. Supp. 372 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
104. Stonehill, 405 F.2d at 745 (citing Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th
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In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,105 by the agent's
own admission, the search of the Mexican property was a joint
venture."' 6 This issue is not addressed by the Supreme Court at
all. However, the circuit court did address this issue by citing a
case with similar facts as the instant case.10 7 In the case cited by
the circuit court, United States v. Emery,08 the court found
that a joint venture existed between Mexican police and United
States DEA agents when the United States agents coordinated
and participated in surveillance of Mr. Emery on Mexican
soil. 09 The court held that "because of a joint venture between
the Mexican and United States officials, the statements made
during the interrogation and in the presence of the DEA agents
should have been suppressed [because no Miranda warning was
given] .. . [and that] the conviction must be reversed for this
reason.""10
Although the issues in Emery are governed by the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments (verbal statements and Miranda warnings)
whereas Verdugo-Urquidez focuses on the Fourth Amendment
and admissibility of evidence, these cases are somewhat analo-
gous. In both situations the law enforcement action was a joint
venture between United States and Mexican authorities. Judi-
cially devised safeguards"' (Miranda warnings in Emery and a
magistrate's warrant in Verdugo-Urquidez) were not effectuated
in either case. Additionally, in both cases acts on the part of the
authorities would have been clearly unconstitutional had they
occurred on United States soil." 2 Therefore, suppression of evi-
dence is warranted in both cases. 1 3
The application of the Fourth Amendment is a much less
Cir. 1966)).
105. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
106. Id. at 262.
107. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1228 (9th Cir. 1988).
108. 591 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1978).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1268.
111. See supra note 3.
112. The remedy afforded to Emery, namely, suppression of his statements, would
have been the same if the events had happened on United States soil. If the Verdugo-
Urquidez scenario had happened on United States soil, the evidence would be sup-
pressed. See also supra note 23 and United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214,
1217 (9th Cir. 1988).
113. The similarity between the cases should bring similar consequences; as the
statements made in Emery were suppressed, so should the evidence obtained in
Verdugo-Urquidez.
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speculative venture than determining whether or not to apply it
in the first place. The Amendment prohibits unreasonable war-
rantless searches as well as searches conducted under general
warrants.11 The Supreme Court, in Johnson v. United States,1 15
mandated that a detached and neutral magistrate must issue a
warrant so as to guard against overzealous law enforcement per-
sonnel. 16 Although searches conducted with warrants are pre-
ferred, the Amendment itself allows a warrantless search if it is
reasonable." 7 This provision has been narrowly interpreted, es-
pecially when applied to nonmovable property, to mean that a
warrantless search is reasonable only in the face of a statutory
scheme or exigent circumstances." 8 Exigent circumstances can
justify a level of intrusion when such intrusion is measured
against the emergency nature of the circumstances, for example,
when evidence will not be available if not immediately seized." e
In this case, however, the Mexican houses were unattended and
the agents had time to consult a magistrate, and therefore no
exigency existed. Further, there is no statutory scheme specifi-
cally condoning extraterritorial warrantless searches. Thus, it is
quite clear that the DEA agents would be in violation of the
Fourth Amendment if it were invoked.
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens maintains that the
United States signing magistrate lacks jurisdiction in Mexico
and, therefore, a warrant would have been useless. 20 However,
114. Amsterdam, supra note 74, at 410.
115. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Statutory schemes that provide for inspection of premises eliminate the need
for a warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (warrantless inspec-
tion of a gun shop, authorized under the Gun Control Act of 1968, is not a violation of
the Fourth Amendment because the owner of such a shop is alerted to inspection ordi-
nances as part of the licensing procedures and, thus, expects them); Donovan v. Dewey,
452 U.S. 592 (1981) (warrantless mine safety inspections authorized by statute). Per-
ceived threats to police safety or an individual's safety, for example, can create exigent
circumstances that will pardon a warrantless search and seizure. See, e.g., People v.
Crawl, 257 N.W.2d 86 (1977) (multi-person chaos in an apartment which was the scene
of a murder investigation allowed officers to execute a full search without a warrant be-
cause there could have been a hidden threat to the officers' safety); State v. Boggess, 340
N.W.2d 516 (1983) (warrantless entry into a home was upheld due to suspected child
abuse in the home).
119. For example, this was the basis for the long standing "Carroll Doctrine" that
originally allowed warrantless searches and seizures of automobiles. The logic is that the
car will leave the jurisdiction before a warrant can be obtained. Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925).
120. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 279 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
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Justice Brennan replies that the Constitution cannot be so
lightly disregarded and that the need to protect suspects from
overzealous police "is no less important abroad than at
home."121 From the DEA's perspective, a warrant would have
safeguarded the fruits of the search regardless of constitutional
challenge.122 It is obvious that either the agent just did not think
of obtaining a warrant or else decided that it was more conven-
ient to not bother with a warrant. Since the Supreme Court does
not sympathize with arguments based upon convenience, there
must be other motivations behind the Court's decision.
3. Analysis of Policy Considerations - Both Stated and
Inferred
The accepted idea that "the United States is entirely a crea-
ture of the Constitution" 123 may currently be in danger. The
pressures of an expanding and varied populace, technological ad-
vancement in every facet of life, and an increased world scope
may be weightier influences on the United States than anyone
would care to admit. These components may be removing the
Supreme Court justices from their positions as "guardians of the
Constitution m2' and instead may be creating a policy-oriented
body. The current national drug crisis is an example of such an
influence on the Court,1 2s and decisions such as United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez126 indicate the ease with which the Supreme
Court abandons the Constitution in order to further national
policy.
concurring).
121. Id. at 296.
122. By obtaining a warrant, the DEA would have been covered under any circum-
stances. Even if, as Justice Stevens points out, the warrant would have had no legal
effect in Mexico, obtaining a warrant would have had a placating effect on the United
States legal system. A warrant would have been, as it is in domestic use, a prophylactic
measure against overzealous law enforcement. The ordinary warrant procedure forces of-
ficers to evaluate their actions because the reasons for issuing a warrant must be
presented to an impartial magistrate. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
123. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 4 (1957).
124. A. HAMLTON, J. MADISON, & J. JAY, supra note 72, at 489.
125. See infra notes 127-43 and accompanying text.
126. 494 U.S. 259 (1990). When bringing the appeal, the United States Department
of Justice indicated that the Ninth Circuit's opinion would "hamper the U.S. war on
foreign drug traffickers." L.A. Times, Apr. 18, 1989, at 1, 4, col. 4. Also see generally
recent cases such as those discussing drug testing and the "open fields doctrine." See
infra notes 131-43.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist's use of Johnson v. Eisentrager27
to illustrate the policy implications of extraterritorial nonappli-
cability of the Bill of Rights provides a harsh comparison to the
instant case. The Chief Justice likens an alleged marijuana
smuggler to convicted Nazi troops and states that the "war on
drugs" is actually being waged through international military ac-
tion. 2 " As Justice Brennan points out in his dissent, Johnson v.
Eisentrager denied foreign enemy soldiers, not nonresident
aliens, Fifth Amendment protection.129 With such strong words,
the Chief Justice seems to be guarding political interests 30
rather than the Constitution. Within the scope of a challenge to
the Fourth Amendment, it is not the Supreme Court's duty to
enforce the Executive's policy. Despite this, it does appear that
an anti-drug policy is driving the majority of the Court.
The erosion of once widespread Fourth Amendment rights
is by no means limited to action in foreign states when it comes
to the issue of drugs. In United States v. Montoya de Her-
nandez,' when a Columbia national was detained at the border
under the suspicion of being a drug smuggler, Justice Rehnquist
delivered another majority opinion.132 The Court held that at
the international border, the balancing test between a person's
Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy and the interests of
the government tip heavily in favor of the government.13
3
The current Court has often attacked a citizen's right to pri-
vacy in the name of law enforcement against drugs. In the two
recent drug-testing cases that have come before the Supreme
Court, 3 4 the majority opinions (written by Justice Kennedy)
127. 339 U.S. 763 (1950); see also supra note 39.
128. The effort against drugs had indeed escalated to military action, but not the
type of action typically identified with a war (for example, United States troops with
arms in foreign states). The United States has supplied arms to drug-producing nations
such as Bolivia. The military's intelligence forces are also deeply involved with interna-
tional supply-side eradication of drugs. Murphy, supra note 12, at 1277, 1278.
129. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 290 (1990) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). See supra note 56.
130. See supra notes 41-42, 58 and accompanying text.
131. 473 U.S. 523 (1985) (in an extraordinary case pitting customs agents against
the calls of nature, Ms. Montoya de Hernandez was suspected of smuggling cocaine in
her alimentary canal. She was detained for 16 hours, following her 10 hour flight, while
customs agents waited for her to urinate or defecate in order to test her wastes. The
customs agents finally obtained a court order for an x-ray and rectal exam. Ms. Montoya
de Hernandez was indeed carrying 528 grams of cocaine in 88 balloons in her system.)
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (a five-
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have carved out exceptions to one's reasonable expectation of
privacy vis-a-vis urinalysis. By creating balancing tests to deter-
mine how intrusive the government's actions may be, states can
assert their interests in inventive ways that, before the advent of
the balancing equations, would not have been allowed.13 5
The view of the Fourth Amendment as the victim of na-
tional drug policies is also supported by the "open fields doc-
trine.1 36 In Oliver v. United States,137 the Court viewed an in-
formant's tip regarding a field of marijuana as a justification for
reducing the expectation of privacy that one has in his or her
farmland.13 The Court reasoned that open fields, unlike homes,
are not places for the types of "intimate activities that the
[Fourth] Amendment is intended to shelter from government in-
terference or surveillance." 39 Thus, the Court held that the
word "property" in the Fourth Amendment did not include open
fields.140
The "open field doctrine" has even been used to uphold law
enforcement's right to conduct a low altitude fly-over of a spe-
cific backyard in order to substantiate an informant's tip about
drugs. 14 ' In his dissent in California v. Ciraolo,'4' even Justice
Powell, the author of the Oliver v. United States majority opin-
to-four decision); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (a six-
to-three decision).
135. Does this mean that the state's interests and purposes have become more com-
pelling, thus having gained "nobility" at the expense of the individual? West, The Su-
preme Court, 1989 Term: Forward: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HAnv. L. REV. 43, 44
(1990). The recent drug urinalysis cases, for example, carve out exceptions to personal
privacy and employment rights under the term "state interest" in interesting ways. In
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989), the Supreme
Court claims job promotion and transfer are vehicles of notice in order to justify drug
testing through urinalysis. In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602
(1989), the Supreme Court authorizes post-accident drug tests for railway workers, re-
gardless of suspicion, because some workers involved in past, unrelated, train accidents
had used drugs or alcohol.
136. Saltzburg, Another Victim of Illegal Narcotics: The Fourth Amendment (As
Illustrated By the Open Fields Doctrine), 48 U. PriT. L. REV. 1 (1986) [hereinafter
Saltzburg, Another Victim].
137. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 179.
140. Id. at 177.
141. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (the fly-over was a result of an anony-
mous informant's tip. This law enforcement effort yielded 73 marijuana plants at the
expense of the defendant's privacy.)
142. Justice Powell prefers to justify the open fields doctrine through a discussion of
curtilage rather than by what can be seen from a commercial airliner's window. Id. at
217-26.
636 [Vol. XVII'3
1991] UNITED STATES v. VERDUGO-URQUIDEZ 637
ion, indicates his trouble with the idea of diminished expecta-
tion of privacy in all open spaces because of commercial air traf-
fic. The extension of the "open fields doctrine" to include
backyard fly-overs by police is a clear reaction to the national
drug problem. As governmental intrusions on the behalf of drug
enforcement increase, a "victim of illegal drugs may be the lib-
erty of a nation."'4
A concern that the Court will expand its powers beyond the
Constitution by claiming that special circumstances must over-
come individual rights is a recurrent theme in our judicial his-
tory. Chief Justice Hughes, in a 1935 decision saving a small
business from the unreasonable burden of President Franklin D.
Roosevelt's sweeping reforms while simultaneously preserving
150 years of constitutional interpretation, asserted that
"[e]xtraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge constitu-
tional power., 4 More recently, Justices Marshall and Brennan
have warned that "history teaches that grave threats to liberty
often come in times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem
too extravagant to endure.' 1 45 It appears that the Supreme
Court's trend of analysis regarding the Fourth Amendment is
moving "toward narrowing the scope . . . and the occasions for
its use.' 46
Justice Brennan, in his dissent in United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, speaks of an inherent mutuality "to ensure
the fundamental fairness . . ." which "also serves to inculcate
the values of law and order" in the policy behind our Constitu-
tion. 47 These views of the United States as a protector of liber-
ties are far more palatable but may be just as unrealistic as the
Chief Justice's "doomsday scenario.' 1 48 Justice Brennan's elo-
quent and sensitive dissent concludes with the inarguable point
that "we cannot expect others to respect our laws until we re-
spect our Constitution.' 49
143. Saltzburg, Another Victim, supra note 136, at 25.
144. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 528 (1935).
145. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 609, 635 (1989) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
146. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNfIED STATES OF AMERICAN ANALYSIS AND INTERPRE-
TATION No. 96-26, 96TH CONG. 1ST SESS. S143-(1979). See also supra notes 131-43 and
accompanying text.
147. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 284-85 (1990) (Brennan, J.
and Marshall, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 291.
149. Id. at 297.
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III. CONCLUSION
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez represents yet another
opportunity 5 ' taken by the Supreme Court to further erode the
protection of the Fourth Amendment. The majority excises ex-
traterritorial searches from the Amendment's warrant clause in
the name of drug eradication. Extraterritorial searches join the
growing list of previously constitutionally guided activities that
have been increasingly attached by the federal government in
the furtherance of national policy.
15
'
Lower courts have wasted no time in applying the Verdugo-
Urquidez holding 52 even though its parameters are unclear. The
Supreme Court has set out a "substantial connections"' 53 test,
not unlike the current civil rules, without defining the test's
components. If the defendant satisfies this test, the Court has
not provided any guidance as to how to judge the reasonableness
of the search in the context of foreign notions of privacy.15 4 Ad-
ditionally, the Supreme Court has neither discussed a potential
remedy for nor any limits on warrantless extraterritorial
searches of alien property. 55 Without clear guidelines, lower
courts may continue to expand this holding and law enforcement
officials will continue to broaden their efforts, with human rights
falling victim.
The general disagreement on the Court even within the ma-
jority as to whether or not Verdugo-Urquidez, who is currently
on United States soil, is protected by the Fourth Amendment is
somewhat reassuring. The Chief Justice's plurality opinion is so
full of national security policy and so short on basic constitu-
tional analysis that there is reason to believe the Court may
again try to define clear rules for the lower courts. Hopefully,
the debate over the reach of the Fourth Amendment is not over.
Mindy Ann Oppenheim
150. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 131-46 and accompanying text for examples. It has even been
suggested that the holding in Verdugo-Urquidez was promulgated in anticipation of the
prosecution against'General Manuel Noriega. Wedgewood, supra note 14, at 753.
152. See supra note 32.
153. The Supreme Court, 1989 Term, supra note 8, at 280.
154. The Supreme Court, 1989 Term, supra note 8, at 285.
155. The Supreme Court, 1989 Term, supra note 8, at 280.
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